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Osamudia R. James
DIvERSITY, DEMOCRACY AND 
WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY: 
SChuette v. CoALition to 
DefenD AffirmAtive ACtion
Spring of 2014 will bring an opinion in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Af-
firmative Action, the Supreme Court’s latest case implicating affirmative action 
in higher education. When issued, it will follow the Court’s last pronouncement 
on affirmative action, made in June 2013 in Fisher v. University of Texas. In that 
opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed that an institution of higher education’s 
consideration of race in the admissions process is subject to strict scrutiny when 
under constitutional review.1 In doing so, the Court also implicitly reaffirmed 
the diversity rationale, as articulated in Grutter v. Bollinger, which allows in-
stitutions of higher education to consider race in the admissions process when 
necessary to admit a diverse entering class. For diversity advocates the Fisher 
holding was a relief, if not a decisive victory, regarding affirmative action, as 
Justices Scalia and Thomas made clear that the only reason they refrained from 
striking down the diversity rationale was because they had not been explicitly 
asked to do so.2 Schuette now presents yet another opportunity for the Court to 
revisit the diversity rationale, and as such, the continuing viability of affirma-
tive action in higher education is again in question. 
The issues to be resolved in Schuette also present an opportunity to examine 
perceptions of race and racial inequality in our democracy, and to consider 
how the diversity rationale shapes those perceptions. Following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Grutter to affirm the diversity rationale, anti-affirmative 
action activists mobilized in opposition. In Michigan, activists successfully 
placed Proposal 2 onto Michigan’s 2006 statewide ballot, an initiative to amend 
the Michigan Constitution to “prohibit all sex- and race-based preferences in 
public education, public employment, and public contracting.”3 After a bal-
loting process in which activists resorted to deceptive tactics,4 it ultimately 
received enough votes to pass by a margin of 58 percent to 42 percent.5 Now 
enshrined in the state’s constitution as Article 1, Section 26, Proposal 2 en-
sures that race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin cannot be considered 
in admissions decisions within the State of Michigan, despite the fact that 
consideration of the same is specifically permitted by Grutter. 
_________________________
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Proposal 2 was eventually challenged by the Coalition to Defend Affirma-
tive Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by Any 
Means Necessary (BAMN), in conjunction with a group of concerned faculty 
members and prospective and current students at the University of Michigan 
(the Cantrell Plaintiffs). Writing for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Cole struck down 
Proposal 2, explaining that it unconstitutionally “‘targets a program that inures 
primarily to the benefit of the minority’ and reorders the political process in 
Michigan in a way that places special burdens on racial minorities.”6 Advo-
cates for other types of admissions criterion, he continued, including athletic 
ability, geographic diversity, or family alumni status, have several options for 
having the state adopt an admissions policy that considers that factor, includ-
ing “lobbying the admissions committee, petitioning university leadership, 
influencing the school’s governing board, or initiating a statewide campaign 
to alter the state constitution.”7 “In contrast,” he further explained, “minor-
ity students seeking to adopt a constitutionally permissible race-conscious 
admission policy can only do one thing: amend the Michigan constitution, a 
process that is described as ‘lengthy, expensive, and arduous…’”8 Judge Cole 
ultimately concluded that because Proposal 2 forces minorities to “surmount 
procedural hurdles in reaching their objectives over which other groups do 
not have to leap,” it thus presents an equal protection violation.9
Now on certiorari to the Supreme Court, the final decision in Schuette may 
significantly impact the fate of race-conscious admissions policies in higher 
education. Current arguments in support of Proposal 2, however, also reflect 
problematic understandings of the nature of race and racism in the United 
States—understandings that are formed, in part, by current deployments of 
the diversity rationale itself. 
The diversity rationale has a negative impact on white understanding of 
race and racial inequality. Although deployed in support of a more racially 
inclusive higher education sector, the rationale does not actually contribute 
to progressive thinking about race and identity. Rather, it perpetuates an old 
story about using black and brown bodies for white purposes, as institutions 
of higher education often do when they admit students of color to capitalize 
on the social and cultural capital that amasses to “diverse” institutions in the 
United States. The University of Wisconsin, for example, photoshopped a 
student of color into an admissions brochure to portray a more racially diverse 
campus than it actually had. As scholars have thoughtfully noted, using stu-
dents of color in this way commodifies racial identity, distancing individuals 
from an integral aspect of their personhood.10 When diversity is pursued for 
primarily aesthetic reasons, it is also often unaccompanied by initiatives to 
genuinely improve the racial climate on campuses and surrounding communi-
ties. These weak commitments to diversity easily buckle under the pressure 
of hard times; indeed, diversity initiatives are often the first to be jettisoned 
in times of financial hardship.11 
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The diversity rationale also reinforces the transparency of white racial 
identity, while emphasizing innocent white identity, because it is untethered to 
notions of social and racial justice, the nature of both individual and structural 
discrimination, or consideration of the impact of white privilege in both the 
admissions process and society more generally. Unaware of the privileges that 
inure to being white, students cannot understand the racialized disadvantages 
that often attach to being non-white. Whites begin, then, to perceive diversity 
initiatives and affirmative action programs as a sort of “reverse discrimina-
tion,” where Whites are the innocent victims of programs and policies that 
benefit undeserving non-Whites who didn’t “work as hard” as victimized 
Whites. One need look no further than Abigail Fisher, the lead plaintiff in 
Fisher v. University of Texas. Asked why she was challenging the University 
of Texas’s use of race in its admission policies, she explained that the only 
difference between her application and that of her minority peers that were 
awarded admission was “the color of [their] skin,”12 and that in challenging 
the policy, she “hop[ed] that [the Supreme Court would] take race out of the 
issue in terms of admissions and that everyone will be able to get into any 
school that they want no matter what race they are but solely based on their 
merit and if they work hard for it.”13 
Superficial deployments of the diversity rationale in higher education also 
leave college students unprepared for democracy. As explained by Danielle 
Allen, citizenship consists of “long-enduring habits of interaction [that] give 
form to public space and so to our political life.”14 In a pluralistic society with 
no shortage of racial inequalities, full citizenship cannot be realized unless 
everyone is given an opportunity to form those social and political habits of 
interaction. A commitment to equal citizenship, then, necessarily requires a 
commitment to bringing everyone into the franchise, even as it requires rec-
ognition that privilege cannot be maintained for particular groups. For Whites, 
this commitment can only develop when accompanied by an honest assessment 
of white privilege, an understanding of how that privilege perpetuates racism 
and differential societal status, and a willingness to release that privilege. 
Current deployment of the diversity rationale, however, fails to encourage 
those developments, resulting instead in white racial-identity performance 
that is unaware that collective democratic action involves communal deci-
sions that will “inevitably benefit some citizens at the expense of others, even 
when the whole community generally benefits.”15 Affirmative action might be 
considered one such decision, particularly because the “benefit” is actually a 
correction for racial exclusion. Whites, however, are often unprepared to incur 
any cost if the ultimate benefit inures to people of color—even if that benefit 
is actually part of a just redistribution. This zero-sum view of dominance and 
power underlies the problematic distribution of power, privilege, and political 
representation by race and makes impossible the sort of inclusive democracy 
for which we should strive.16
diversity, democracy and white racial identity
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Which brings us back, then, to Schuette. The very Michigan constitutional 
amendment that prompted the case is an example of the problems with the 
current deployment of the diversity rationale. Divorced from any concep-
tion of remediation or social justice, diversity is a palatable goal as long as 
it remains non-threatening. When, however, Whites are asked to relinquish 
some measure of privilege to bring others into the franchise, diversity is 
quickly jettisoned; unanchored from moorings that fully articulate the need 
for diversity, it becomes all too easy to assert that the pursuit of diversity is 
not just inconvenient, but also reverse racism. In the context of the Schuette 
case, Proposal 2, deceptively cloaked in language that purported to promote 
equality, ultimately passed. Passing a ballot initiative to amend a state con-
stitution sounds like a legitimate democratic exercise, but was actually the 
use of a democratic process to further exclude minorities and other socially 
marginalized groups from access to representation, participation and power.
In his Sixth Circuit opinion, Judge Cole admirably highlighted the demo-
cratic defect that Proposal 2 and the ensuing amendment to Michigan’s con-
stitution reflect: Proposal 2 effectively makes it more difficult for minorities 
to petition their government officials to properly account for structural disad-
vantage based on race or ethnicity. Proposal 2 does not, as Michigan Attorney 
General Schuette argued in his Supreme Court brief, merely require equal 
treatment of the laws.17 Rather, by endorsing a constitutional amendment that 
requires absolute “race-neutrality,” structural disadvantage by race is ignored 
as long as it is not reflected in official policy. As a result, state admissions 
policies that do account for structural advantage by allowing admissions of-
ficers to consider race or ethnicity as one factor in decisions become the only 
“discriminatory” policies that need to be dismantled.
The irony, of course, is that it is precisely a superficial deployment of diver-
sity that has helped advance this inversion of equal protection jurisprudence. 
Both ahistorical and acontextual, the diversity rationale ignores issues of 
racial or social justice, and is silent on the privilege typically afforded Whites 
in the public school system, from elementary school to higher education. 
Such a view of race and discrimination in the United States has informed the 
Supreme Court-sanctioned “colorblind” approach to equal protection, which 
finds a potential equal protection violation whenever the state differentiates 
between similarly situated groups.18 In the context of race, this has led to the 
preservation of facially neutral laws that have a disparate impact on minority 
groups, such as Proposal 2. These laws are upheld so long as no intentional 
discriminatory purpose is found. At the same time, race-conscious govern-
ment policies that are implemented with the specific intent to ameliorate racial 
inequality are prohibited.19
To be clear, the goal of diversity is not the problem, as I support and en-
dorse efforts to diversify institutions of higher education. Indeed, institutions 
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that function as gatekeepers to valuable social and cultural capital are funda-
mentally illegitimate if that access is limited to the racially and economically 
privileged. Rather, it is the ways in which Whites react to those goals, as 
informed by the superficial deployment of the diversity rationale, that is the 
problem. Although the diversity narrative is one of inclusion, by magnifying 
the transparency phenomenon, the rationale encourages simplistic and unre-
alistic notions of merit, while discouraging recognition of white privilege. 
It also perpetuates white identities grounded in racial innocence, such that 
would-be plaintiffs are free to challenge even the diversity rationale, itself, 
as unfair to Whites.  
Unless remedied, the impact of the diversity rationale on white racial 
identity and understanding of race has long-term negative consequences for 
racial justice. We are, for example, potentially on the precipice of a Supreme 
Court decision in Schuette that will provide a model for others opposed to 
affirmative action to eliminate it through “democratic” processes.  To prevent 
this, institutional narratives about diversity and use of the diversity rationale 
as justification for race-conscious measures must shift away from narratives 
about the usefulness and benefits of diversity toward a narrative that also 
address the illegitimacy of all-white institutions. Diversity is not just about 
training students for a global marketplace, citizenship, or deepening intellectual 
exchange—it is also about broadening access to social and cultural capital for 
all, including poor people and people of color.
At colleges and universities, this means more than a blurb about diversity 
in the glossy pages of admissions materials. Instead, institutions should initiate 
broader campaigns committed to informing potential and current members 
of university communities that their mission necessarily includes broadened 
access for all. All schools may not necessarily adhere to such a mission, but 
institutions that advocate a commitment to the diversity rationale in admis-
sions purportedly do and so can be expected to deepen their commitment to 
diversity in ways that positively impact white racial identity. 
Relatedly, institutional commitments to individualized review must be 
better contextualized for students. Admissions is an inherently individual-
ized, subjective, and idiosyncratic process. That reality, however, should not 
be used only to justify the consideration of race, but should also be used to 
help students understand the multitude of factors that are considered in the 
applications of each student. Individualized review may consider the athletic 
background of some students, the legacy status of others, and the unique social 
experiences of minority students—experiences that are informed by race, no 
matter what the student’s ultimate worldview. Individualized review may also 
consider the racial or ethnic background that privileges some students prior 
to college. Other factors like class or disability may (or may not) mitigate or 
compound marginalization or privilege on account of race and ethnicity, and 
diversity, democracy and white racial identity
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admissions officers will often have to make hard decisions about how these 
factors affect students, and whether the institution would be best served by 
that student’s admission and enrollment. To this extent, individualized review 
does not attempt to remedy societal discrimination, but it does take into ac-
count the social impact of race on all applicants—white and non-white—and 
on the institutions themselves, and should be discussed as such. The goal is 
not necessarily to make every rejected (or admitted) applicant perfectly happy 
with an institution’s admissions decisions, but to help the Abigail Fishers of 
the world accept those decisions by enabling them to understand the larger 
societal context in which those decisions are made.
In the post-admissions context, a more substantive commitment to diversity 
might look like mandatory classes for incoming students about the racialized 
nature of opportunity and inequality in the United States.20 Given the aspects 
of white identity most negatively impacted by superficial deployments of 
diversity, such a course would explore white and non-white racial identity, 
racial privilege, or narratives of meritocracy in the United States. This ap-
proach signals not just a commitment to improved racial climate, but a step 
toward unpacking myths about merit while making white privilege more 
visible, such that anti-racist white identity can develop. Lest such a mandate 
seem unnecessary, consider the Minneapolis Community and Technical Col-
lege, where a Professor of English and African Diaspora studies was formally 
reprimanded under the College’s anti-discrimination policy for making white 
students feel uncomfortable in her classroom discussions of structural racism 
and white privilege.21 
Ultimately changes like these can help mediate the flawed social and 
political climate that led to Proposal 2 in the first place. In the meantime, we 
must rely on the Supreme Court’s forthcoming opinion in Schuette to uphold 
Judge Cole’s attempts to right the political defect that our current diversity 
rationale has promoted. Given, however, the hints that several Justices dropped 
in Fisher, you’ll forgive me if I am not holding my breath.
__________________________
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